Abstract-In this paper, we explore potential correlations of fatal system events for one of the most powerful supercomputers-IBM Blue Gene/Q Mira, which is deployed at Argonne National Laboratory, based on its 5-year reliability, availability, and serviceability (RAS) log. Our contribution is two-fold. (1) We design an efficient log analysis tool, namely LogAider, with a novel filtering method to effectively extract fatal events from masses of system messages that are heavily duplicated in the log. LogAider exhibits a very precise detection of temporal-correlation with a high similarity (up to 95 percent) to the ground-truth (i.e., compared to the failure records reported by the administrators). The total number of fatal events can be reduced to about 1,255 compared with originally 2.6 million duplicated fatal messages. (2) We analyze the 5-year RAS log of the MIRA system using LogAider, and summarize six important "takeaways" which can help system vendors and administrators better understand an extreme-scale system's fatal events. Specifically, we find that the distribution or proportion of the fatal system events follow a Pareto-like principle in general. The temporal correlation among fatal events is much stronger than that of warn messages and info messages, and the correlated events tend to constitute a few clusters. The mean time between fatal events (MTBFE) of the Mira system is about 1.3 days from the perspective of the system, and the MTTI is 2-4 days from the perspective of users. The most error-prone item value with respect to any key attribute appears likely in the log every 2-10 days. Weibull, Gamma, and Pearson6 are the three best-fit distributions for the fatal event intervals. The overall correlation of fatal events on the 5D torus network is not prominent, whereas the small-region locality correlation (e.g., the fatal events inside racks) is relatively strong. We believe our work will be interesting to large-scale HPC system administrators and vendors and to fault tolerance researchers, enabling them to better understand fatal events and mitigate such events accordingly.
INTRODUCTION
M ANY of today's scientific problems are too complicated to solve by only theoretical analysis or simple simulations. Instead, scientists have to conduct large-scale or even extreme-scale scientific simulations using large amounts of resources. For example, using about 83k cores of one of the world's most powerful supercomputers, scientists were able to mimic only 1 percent of one second's worth of human brain activity-and even that took 40 minutes [1] . Lengthy, large-scale simulations have a high-probability of encountering failures during execution [2] . Hence, one needs an indepth understanding of the properties of different types of fatal events in an HPC environment and their correlations, so that these events and their impact can be mitigated. Many system failures, however, could be very peculiar, such that even an experienced administrator may take a long time (several to dozens of minutes per fatal event) to identify their root-causes. In this paper, we analyze 5 years of system logs regarding reliability, availability, and serviceability (RAS) for the IBM Blue Gene/Q Mira system [3] at Argonne National Laboratory. We proposed six important takeaways that disclose the latent rules behind the fatal system messages, based on our probability analysis and our designed similarity-based correlation mining tool.
The system RAS log we collected has three severity levels for the recorded messages: INFO, WARN, and FATAL. We focus mainly on FATAL messages in this study, because fatal level represents a severe error event that presumably leads the applications to fail or abort, according to the Blue Gene/ Q administration guide [4] . Exploring the properties/correlations of fatal events in such an extreme-scale system with long-term logging period, however, brings three critical challenges. First of all, the event messages are heavily duplicated throughout the whole logging period because of complicated factors such as periodic recording behavior of the logging system, spatial correlations of various events, and temporal error propagation phenomenon, such that it is non-trivial to accurately extract the source of the fatal events. Second, the system log involves dozens of fields in each table and also involves the maintenance records produced by system administrators, which should be excluded. Last but not the least, the MIRA system [3] adopts a complicated 5D Torus network, introducing a particular difficulty in mining the spatial correlations of messages.
The contribution of our work is two-fold.
(1) We propose a novel log analysis tool, namely LogAider [6] , which can effectively mine the potential correlations in a S. Di, H. Guo, R. Gupta, E. R. Pershey, and F. Cappello are with the Mathematics and Computer Science (MCS), Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, IL 60439. E-mail: disheng222@gmail.com, {hguo, pershey}@anl. gov, {rgupta, cappello}@mcs.anl.gov. M. Snir is with the Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820. E-mail: snir@illinois.edu. large-scale system log. This tool was also published in our conference paper [5] previously. On the one hand, LogAider can filter the duplicated messages very effectively, by taking into account as many factors as possible, including severity level, the administrator's maintenance periods, reservation periods, temporal correlation, spatial correlation on a Torus network, and weighted similarities calculated based on their attributes and locations across different messages. On the other hand, LogAider is able to mine spatial and temporal correlations by leveraging a series of probabilistic analyses. We also developed an improved K-means clustering algorithm to explore the potential spatial correlations over the network topology (e.g., the torus network in Mira [3] ).
The evaluation based on MIRA RAS log shows that the LogAider is helpful for revealing spatial-correlations and very accurate (up to 95 percent similarity compared with ground-truth) in the mining of temporal correlations. The total number of fatal events is reduced to 1255 compared with originally 2.6 million fatal messages.
(2) Based on the fatal events extracted from a total of 60 million messages in the 5-year log by LogAider, we performed an analysis of the potential properties and correlations of fatal events in the extreme-scale system, which is a specific contribution proposed in this journal paper. In particular, we answer the following key questions.
What is the proportion of different types of fatal events, based on attributes such as component, category, location, and execution scale? Not surprisingly, the distribution obeys a Pareto principle: the majority of the fatal events (about 80 percent) are involved with only a small set of attribute values. More specifically, we find that majority of the system fatal events are in the software error category or related to Blue Gene/Q compute card or Blue Gene/Q link errors. The most error-prone components are related to the detection and control of hardware (abbreviated as firmware), control net (abbreviated as CtrlNet), and the machine controllers running on service nodes (abbreviated as MC). What is the temporal correlation between events? Is there a correlation across different types of events? What is the temporal fatal event rate? Is there a seasonality for the fatal event rate? What is the best-fit distribution of the fatal event intervals throughout the five years, in terms of different attribute values (such as component, category, and location mode)? We analyze the correlation of events (or message IDs) based on Pearson correlation, euclidean distance, and principle component analysis (PCA). We characterize the daily count for the fatal events that are output by our message filter designed based on similarity analysis. We observe that highly correlated messages tend to cluster together, exhibiting a strong mutual correlation with each other. The filtered fatal events show a strong seasonality (i.e., more errors in the hot season). Weibull, Gamma, and Pearson6 are the three best-fit distributions for the fatal event intervals. What is the spatial distribution of the fatal events in the system? We noted that for a relatively long-term period, the locality feature of the fatal events across different racks is hardly observed over the 5D-torus topology of Blue Gene/Q. This observation contrasts with the observation on the distribution of specific errors such as XID 13 errors on Titan supercomputer [7] , which exhibits a prominent locality feature on a 3D torus network [8] . However, we do observe a certain correlation over the 5D torus network for a shortterm period, and strong locality correlations in particular small regions such as within a rack. That is, for the error-prone racks, all their nodes likely encounter fatal events instead of only one or two nodes. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related work from the perspective of overall analysis. In Section 3, we present an overview of MIRA system and describe the RAS log we collected. In Section 4, we present our designed log analysis tool, LogAider, including how we filter the duplicated messages and how we explore the temporal and spatial correlations of fatal events. In Section 5, we investigate fatal event properties, such as the proportion of fatal events based on specific attributes. We also analyze the best-fit distribution and temporal correlation of fatal events, the fatal event intervals, and seasonality, as well as their spatial correlation. We summarize six takeaways and highlight the novel insights by comparing other related studies. In Section 6, we conclude the paper and discuss our future work.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we describe the related work from the perspective of the analysis focus and execution scales. We will highlight in details our new insights compared to other related work, in the critical takeaways summarized in the following sections.
Our study contrasts with many related studies that have focused only on one particular aspect of a system (such as memory fault) or studied a medium-sized cluster for a relatively short period. Li et al. [9] characterized only the faults that cause long latency crashes (i.e., the faults that can persist for a long time) in programs. Hwang et al. [10] investigated the nature of DRAM errors and their implications for the system design. Siddiqua et al. [11] presented DRAM/SRAM faults (including fault modes, types and rate changes) collected on a production system. Sridharan et al. [12] , [13] examined the impact of errors and aging on DRAM and identify a significant inter-vendor effect on DRAM fault rates. Yuan et al. [14] studied the properties of job failures based on 10 HPC datasets across different sites. Their key observation was that the interarrival time of failed jobs is best fit by Pareto and lognormal distribution and that the probability of failed job submissions follows a "V" shape. One critical difference between their work and ours is that we comprehensively explored the system fatal events instead of only focusing on the job failures. Moreover, their execution scales are thousands of processors, which is much smaller than that of the Mira system (786k cores).
Although there are some studies conducting an overall analysis (such as failure rate of the entire system), their analyses are generally limited to small/medium-sized system or relatively short-term logging period. Fu and Xu [15] explored the spatial properties of system failures on extreme-scale HPC systems and revealed the locality feature of fatal events in the system, while they focused on previous generations of Blue Gene systems such as Blue Gene/L and Blue Gene/P) or a Grid cluster at Washington State University (WSU), whose scales are much smaller than our target system, IBM Blue Gene/Q. Zheng et al. [16] provided a coanalysis of RAS logs based on a Blue Gene/P system [18] ; their study, however, was based on an older, smaller cluster (163k cores) with a short logging period (273 days). Javadi et al. [17] developed a Failure Trace Archive (FTA)-an online, public repository of failure traces collected from diverse parallel and distributed systems, and analyzed the features of failure events across multiple Grid systems. The data sets collected by FTA, however, are mainly based on relatively old systems (released before 2009) mostly on top of desktop Grid or P2P network, which is largely different from our RAS log data generated on MIRA supercomputer system with a Torus network.
Because of fast increasing scales of today's supercomputers, some researchers have studied failure events in the extreme-scale (or peta-scale) supercomputing environment. Tiwari et al. [19] explored GPU errors on large-scale HPC systems. Gupta et al. [8] , [20] explored spatial properties of system failures on an extreme-scale HPC system, the Cray XK7 Titan with a total of 300k CPU cores, and also presented reliability lessons Learned from GPU experience with the Titan supercomputer at Oak Ridge Leadership Computing Facility. Using a log analysis tool called LogDiver, Di Martino et al. [21] presented an in-depth characterization of the resiliency with more than 5 million HPC applications that were run on the Blue Waters supercomputer [22] . We note that all these works were based on supercomputers made by Cray Inc., a different vendor from that of Blue Gene/Q supercomputer, thus their design architecture are different from IBM Blue Gene/Q systems in our study. For instance, Blue Waters adopts a Gemini high-speed network while MIRA is using 5D torus network; Blue Waters employs a Lustre-based file system while MIRA adopts IBM general parallel file system (GPFS). Hence, their analysis results cannot be simply applied to IBM Blue Gene/Q system. Moreover, the existing characterization work mainly focus on only the failures or system errors related to user applications, such as Mean Node Hours Between Failures (MNBF) and Mean Time Between Interrupt (MTBI). By comparison, our work reveals the properties/correlations of all fatal events, i.e., the potential failures that may affect user jobs, which could be thought of as a kind of worst-case situation for users from the perspective of hardware/firmware issues. Moreover, most of the existing studies mainly worked on medium-size systems with relative short logging period. Nie et al. [23] characterized temperature, power, and soft-error behaviors for one of the most fastest supercomputers -Titan, while their investigation period spans only 5 months. Although Gupta et al. [24] studied the reliability characteristics of five large-scale HPC systems spanning a total of 8 years, each of its system logs is rather old (produced 3-6 years ago) and relatively short (1-4 years), and the system scales are either small (say, only 736 nodes) or medium (19k nodes) in size. By contrast, our system log spans a longer period (5 years) and is rather new (up to August 2017), also involving larger scale (786k cores on a total of 50k nodes). Liu and Chen [25] studied the failure intervals for Sunway series supercomputers in terms of memory errors, CPU errors and the mainframe failures. Their studies cannot be applied to the IBM BlueG/Q system because of largely different architecture and network. In particular, the overall failure count reported in their paper is 13k-17k per year, which is significantly larger than the failure count we characterized (about 250 per year) based on MIRA.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the Blue Gene/Q supercomputer Mira and its system log used in our study. An organizational diagram of the BlueG/Q system can be found in IBM BlueG/Q system administrator guide [4] (see Figs. 1 and 2 in that document).
The Mira System
Mira system is a 10-petaflops IBM Blue Gene/Q system operated by Argonne National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy. It is one of the fastest supercomputers in the world [27] . Mira consists of 48 racks containing 49,152 compute nodes, each of which has a PowerPC A2 1600 MHz processor with 16 active cores (bringing the total to 786,432 cores for the entire machine). The compute nodes assigned to jobs are arranged in the form of blocks, each of which is represented by x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 À y 1 y 2 y 3 y 4 y 5 , where x i and y i denote the first and last node index in the i'th dimension of the 5D torus.
Each compute rack in the Mira system has two midplanes (denoted M0 and M1); an I/O drawer; and additional infrastructure to support bulk power supply, power modules, clock, and coolant monitors. Each midplane has 16 node boards and 1 service card. Each of the node boards has 32 compute cards, 36 optical modules, and link chips to connect to the 5D torus network. Each compute card contains one processor and 16G DDR3 memory. The I/O drawer comes with its own set of 8 I/O cards, 8 PCIe Gen2 x8 slots, optical modules, link module, and fan assembly.
The Mira system follows IBM's 5D torus interconnect configuration, with 2 GB/s chip-to-chip links for connecting the nodes. The Mira system uses a single network for point-topoint, collectives, and barrier communication (in contrast to prior generations of Blue Gene systems). Each node has 10 links with 2 Gb/s bandwidth, with an additional 11th link for communication with the I/O nodes. Links between the midplanes are optical and within the midplane are electrical. 
Mira RAS Log
The Blue Gene/Q core monitoring and control system (CMCS) is responsible for monitoring the hardware components, including compute nodes, I/O nodes, and various networks. Monitored information is reported by CMCS as RAS event records, which are used to provide diagnosis and failure prediction facilities. Hence, the RAS log is the most important system log in the Mira system, and it contains valuable reliability information. The RAS log we used in our study is available to download from Argonne Leadership Computing Facility (ALCF) website [26] .
The RAS log has a total of 14 fields, but only a few of them are critical to the system reliability. We therefore focus only on the key fields or attributes, which are described in Table 1 . For instance, record ID is excluded in our study since it carries no meaningful information. An event's occurrence time is excluded when studying the overall distribution of the fatal events or their portions. Note that msg ID is particularly important because each message record is uniquely identified by a message ID that represents a type of event. Category indicates the entity or type of event (such as software error, cablerelated event, or compute-card-related event). Component is important in that it is the software unit (or sensor/detector) detecting and reporting RAS events.
LOGAIDER: MINING SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL CORRELATIONS OF LOG EVENTS
In this section, we describe LogAider [5] , [6] , a tool for mining potential correlations of HPC log events. The whole log analysis toolkit involves four layers: user interface layer, analysis engine layer, log parsing layer, and log data layer, as shown in Fig. 1 . We omit the detailed description to the layers here because of the space limitation. We refer the readers to our prior conference paper [5] for details.
In what follows, we mainly describe how the LogAdier filters the duplicated messages in the RAS log and how to mine the correlations among fatal messages in both space and time, which is fundamental to our following analysis.
Spatiotemporal Duplicated Message Filtering based on Similarity Analysis
As mentioned previously, the RAS log has three types of messages, INFO, WARN and FATAL. Fig. 2 presents the distribution of the daily message count in 2015. We can see that the numbers of info messages and warn messages (represented by blue and orange curves, respectively) per day are fairly large (up to 100k per day), whereas only about 1k fatal messages (represented by red curves) are reported per day most of the time. This observation motivates us to focus mainly on the fatal messages. Moreover, according to the IBM Blue Gene/Q administration guide [4] , fatal events indicate the potential system errors. After removing the info messages and warn messages, however, we note that the fatal messages are still highly duplicated. As illustrated in Fig. 3 , the daily count of the fatal messages reached 36k in 2015, which is inconsistent with the observed mean time to interruption (MTTI). Specifically, the MTTI for Mira is to be 2-4 days (i.e., only 2-3 significant issues per week) from the perspective of users, as pointed out by the system administrator. Hence, we need to further filter the duplicated fatal messages for our analysis.
Similar to other characterization work [16] of the system failures, we also observe that many duplicated messages in the RAS log appear in both the spatial and temporal dimensions. One event, such as coolant system problem or power outage of some rack, may significantly affect many relevant modules, leading to a large number of fatal messages generated by the monitoring system. To address this issue, we designed a three-staged message filtering method, also known as fatal event constructor, that can remove the duplicated messages effectively. The pseudocode is presented in Algorithm 1.
In the fatal event construction algorithm, Stage I is a preprocessing step used to remove the duplicated messages by fundamental query operations. After removing the nonfatal messages, we remove the fatal messages that happened during the system maintenance periods. Basically, there are two maintenances per month, each lasting about 12 hours. During a maintenance period, the system administrator checks the system's multiple parts to make sure it is running in a good state. During the maintenance, fatal messages may be generated in order to test the monitoring system; thus the maintenance periods are excluded in our study. In addition to the maintenance periods, we filter the fatal messages by taking into account the reservation periods. In particular, when a severe event (also called an event source in the following text) strikes a system module such as rack, midplane, or coolant system, the system administrator generally requests a reservation period to fix the affected module. That is, during the reservation period, a block of machines is locked, and multiple fatal events are produced because of the event source that already occurred or because of the test operations. All the follow-up fatal messages should be grouped into one fatal event together with the event source. In Stage II, we perform a spatiotemporal filter. Basically, there are two types of duplicated messages. Some fatal events are reported periodically (every about 5-15 minutes) at the same location in the system, because of the periodic logging mechanism. We call this type of duplicated messages temporal duplication. On the other hand, we observe that a large number of fatal events may occur with extremely close timestamps but on different locations (such as compute nodes or I/O nodes). These are probably due to error propagation: one fatal event source (such as linkage error or power outage) may incur many other events (such as the disconnection of nodes) on different locations in the system. We call this type of duplication spatial duplication.
Stage III is the most critical step, in which we designed a similarity-based filter to further remove the duplicated messages that escape from the previous two stages. We observe that some fatal events may occur relatively far away each other in the temporal dimension (e.g., 30+ minutes), although they look alike based on their attributes such as location, component, category, or message ID. Therefore, we developed a weighted similarity-based approach that can identify the correlated fatal messages accurately, to be detailed in next subsection.
A Weighted Similarity-Based Algorithm for Mining Temporal Correlations
We present the pseudo-code of the similarity-based temporalcorrelation mining algorithm in Algorithm 2. The inputs are the event_messages that have been filtered in Stage I and Stage II of Algorithm 1, such that the algorithm focuses only on the temporal correlation of events. The key idea is to compute the similarity between every event and its following events within a certain short period, in chronological order (lines 1-17), and group the events with its preceding events based on the similarity (line 18-22). We design two types of the delay threshold for selecting the subsequent events followed by a target event as the candidate correlated events, based on whether the message ID is the same. Specifically, the delay threshold of the two events with different message IDs should be shorter than that of the two events with the same message ID, because the events with the same message ID are more likely correlated with each other even though their occurrence interval is relatively long (e.g., a couple of hours). We map the correlation between the target event and its candidate subsequent events, as long as their similarity values exceed a threshold . The lower , the more relax the correlation-setting condition is, then less groups eventually. We note that the temporal-correlation clustering results do not change significantly with different settings (to be shown later), indicating a high fidelity of our algorithm. 
Compute similarity u(msg i ,msg j ) with T d ;{Formula (1)} 7:
else if (t j À t i T s and msg_ID(msg i )==msg_ID(msg j )) then 8:
Compute similarity u(msg i ,msg j ) with T s ;{Formula (1 Our temporal-correlation mining algorithm has three key features. (1) Its working principle is close to human's inference behavior, in that it explores the temporal-correlations not only based on occurrence time stamps but also based on the similarity of two events on multiple attributes, such as event types (i.e., message ID), category, and location. ( 2) The similarity function for each field is customizable on demand, and hence can optimize the accuracy of the analysis. (3) This algorithm has a linear time complexity O(N), in that the time complexity of computing the similarity of each event and its subsequent events can be thought of as a constant. This is due to the fact that the fatal events in a supercomputer always occur sparsely over time. In this case, the occurrence interval follows an exponential distribution; that is, the occurrence of fatal events can be treated as a Poisson process [28] with a fixed number of events per time unit.
The significance of a message's information is different with various fields in the log. For instance, message ID in the Mira RAS log is one of the most important fields because it determines the values of many other fields, such as the category of the event. Another key information is the location where the event occurs. Since the system has a total of 48 racks and 96 midplanes, the two events will likely be correlated if they occur on the same rack or midplane within a short period. Our LogAider allows to assign different weights for different fields in a configuration file. The similarity function is also customizable based on the features of fields. The overall similarity between two event messages is the weighted sum of the similarity value of each important field specified by the user, as presented in Formula (1), and its value must be in the range [0,1].
where i is the field index, v i is its weight, a i and b i are referred to as two values of the field i in the two messages respectively, and # i is the corresponding similarity function.
In the Mira RAS log, six key fields are used to estimate the similarity of two messages: msg ID, event time, location code, location mode, component and category, which are described as follows.
Similarity of msg ID: Message ID is the unique identifier of an RAS event, and each consists of 8 digits (such as 00080012) that can be split into two parts. The first four digits indicate the component family, and the last four digits identify the event feature. Hence, the similarity is defined as
first 4 digits are different. 0:5; first 4 digits are same, last 4 are not. 1; all 8 digits are the same.
< :
Similarity of event time: The closer the two messages occur in time, the higher the correlation they should have. Thus, the similarity w.r. We evaluated the accuracy of our similarity-based temporal-correlation mining strategy using the Mira RAS log in the year 2015. Duplicated messages have been filtered by the temporal-spatial filter with a filtering period of 1 minute, in that we focus only on temporal correlation in this experiment. Only 407 filtered fatal events are left, compared with originally 100k non-filtered fatal messages. We build the ground-truth clustering by manually classifying the fatal events into different clusters based on their complex attribute information and asking the system administrator to further adjust it based on his diagnosis log. We then run our solution (called Similarity-Based Miner or SBM, T d = 30 minutes, T s = 18 hours), and observe that the fatal event count is further reduced to 193, which is lower by 52.6 percent than the duplication-filtered event count.
We run two other state-of-the-art approaches temporalspatial miner (TSM) and adaptive semantic miner (ASM) for the comparison. TSM is a mining strategy modified from temporal-spatial filter, and it merges the nearby events only based on time stamps and event types. ASM is designed based on Adaptive Semantic Filter [29] , that makes use of f correlation coefficient [30] to filter/merge the similar events and also adaptively enhances the merging threshold as time gap increases. We traverse time thresholds (from 1 minute to 18 hours) for TSM and ASM to search for their best results.
We adopt clustering similarity [31] to assess the accuracy of the generated clusters of events in terms of our similaritybased analysis and the ground-truth clustering results generated by the system administrator. The clustering similarity is defined as follows.
where
where C 1 and C 2 are two sets of clusters respectively. In our case, C 1 is the clustering sets generated by the solution, and C 2 is the ground-truth clustering sets. We present the clustering similarity of the three comparative solutions in Fig. 4 . As shown in the figure, we evaluate the solutions based on two types of fatal event sets: one with all fatal events and the other one with only suspicious fatal events each of which has a neighbor event with at most a one-day interval. Based on the figure, we can see that the clustering similarity of our solution (SBM) can reach up to 95 percent when is set to lower than 0.6, so 0.6 is the recommended setting in practice. We also observe that the clustering result of our solution is very stable: !90 percent in most threshold settings. By comparison, ASM can lead clustering similarity only up to 89 percent, and it is very sensitive to the time threshold setting. The key reason SBM performs much better than ASM and TSM is twofold: (1) SBM allows users to customize more reasonable similarity for each of the key fields, and (2) SBM treats various fields with different weights, a strategy that can lead to more accurate estimate on the overall similarity.
K-Means Clustering for Mining Spatial Correlations
In addition to the generic visualization of event distribution, we integrate a set of statistical analyses for mining the spatial correlations of the events. To this end, we reconstruct the links among all machines based on their connection topology. In what follows, we present how to reconstruct the topology in Mira.
In Mira, all the compute resources are allocated to jobs in the unit of the midplane. Thus the spatial correlation for Mira is supposed to be analyzed based on the acrossmidplane structure. The overall system adopts a 5D torus to interconnect all the machines, and every midplane connects to others using the first four dimensions (or four links, denoted as A, B, C, and D). In our previous conference paper, we presented a figure to illustrate the links among midplanes in MIRA system. We omit the figure in this journal paper because of the space limitation.
We develop a novel K-means clustering algorithm that can optimize the number of groups (or sets) based on the torus topology. Our algorithm differs from the traditional K-means clustering algorithm in two ways. (1) Unlike the traditional algorithm that requires fixing the number of clustering groups in advance, our algorithm optimizes the group counts by merging the nearby centroids of groups automatically until the convergence. (2) Unlike the traditional K-means algorithm that conducts the clustering in a euclidean space, the distance between any two points (i.e., between two midplanes in Mira) is computed by identifying the shortest path between them in the torus. We create the initial cluster based on the Forgy method [32] . The calculation of distance between two resource units (or midplanes) M 1 and M 2 on Torus is given as follows:
where size x refers to the size at dimension x, and i x ðM 1 Þ refers to the location index of the midplane M 1 at the dimension link x. The distance(R00-M1; R1D-M0), for example, is computed as 5 according to the formula.
Practical Usage of LogAider
Although LogAider was originally developed for the analysis of MIRA system log, we try to make it as generic as possible for other systems when we design and implement it. LogAider loads the input log data by reading the log files in the form of a well-known data-exchange format -Comma-Separated Values (CSV), which is commonly used by many Log providers (such as Failure Trace Archive [17] ). The analysis executables (such as spatiotemporal filter and across-field analyzer) can recognize the fields and format of the log by loading a usercustomizable schema file. In order to enable LogAider to plot spatial distribution of events for other systems, we designed an easy-to-use lay-out template for users to customize based on their own multi-layer system architectures (in MIRA, for instance, the layers are Rack -midplane -nodeboard -cardboard). Moreover, we release all the codes as an open-source on github, so that the users can also modify them to fit their own demand if necessary. More details about installation and usage of LogAider can be found in our github website [6] .
PROPERTY/CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF FATAL RAS EVENTS
In this section, we focus on the critical properties of fatal RAS events extracted by our LogAider filter. In our filtering, the weights of the six attributes are set to 0.2, 0.05, 0.05, 0.35, 0.2, and 0.15, which is based on the empirical significance of each attribute. For instance, msg_ID determines the type of failures, so it should have a relatively high weight; the location mode has the highest priority because the two messages will be likely correlated as long as they have very similar locations based on our observations. The overall threshold of the weighted similarity is set to 0.3, because such a setting can already lead to effective filtering, as verified by the system administrator. Specifically, the final number of fatal events constructed by our filter is reduced to 1,255, compared with the original 2.6 million fatal messages and 28,431 fatal events after performing the first two stages. The correctness of the 1,255 filtered events have been verified by the system administrator. Based on the filtered messages, we study the distribution of fatal events in the system, as well as the fatal event count and MTBFE, based on the critical hardware parts (such as compute node and I/O node). We also explore the potential correlations among the events in both the temporal and spatial dimensions.
Proportion Analysis of Fatal RAS Events
We first investigate the proportions of fatal events with respect to different RAS attributes, including component, 1 category, 2 location mode, 3 and block size, as shown in Fig. 4 . Evaluation of temporal correlation mining accuracy.
1. Component values are explained as follows. MC: machine controller running on the service node, CIOS: common I/O services, FIRMWARE: sensor/monitor of hardware, CTRLNET: the control components related to network such as link chip, CNK: compute node kernel, MMCS: the control system running on the service node, BAREMETAL: service-related facilities, BGMASTER: Blue Gene/Q distributed process manager that monitors control system processes, and DIAGS: diagnostic functions running on a compute or an I/O or the service node.
2. Category values are described as follows. BQC: Blue Gene/Q compute card, Card: generic card/board, BGL: Blue Gene/Q link module, and AC_TO_DC_PWR: bulk power supply.
3. Location_mode refers to the location or specific hardware in which the event occurred. For instance, Qxx-Ixx-Jxx (or QIJ) means compute cards on I/O boards in an I/O rack. Rxx-Mx-Nxx-Jxx (abbreviated as RMNJ here) represents a specific compute card on a node board, and Rxx-Mx-Nxx (or RMN) refers to a node board. Rxx-MxNxx-Uxx (or RMNU) refers to the link module associated with a node board. More explanations can be found in [4] . Table 2 . We observe that the proportion of fatal events, in terms of the component, category, and location_mode, roughly follows a Pareto-like principle [33] . In particular, a few attribute values are involved in a large majority of fatal events, whereas the majority of the other attribute values belong to only a small portion of the fatal events.
The first two columns, for example, indicate about 80 percent of fatal events are related to only three components-MC (machine controller running on the service node), FIRMWARE (sensor/monitor of hardware), and CTRLNET (the control components related to network such as link chip)-from a total of 17 component values. Specifically, over one-third of fatal events are due to the firmware issues, and about one-fifth of fatal events are due to the machine controllers running on the service nodes, such as unavailable temperature data, malfunctioning system clock, or problems related to field programmable gate arrays or the bulk power module. We also present the proportion of fatal events with respect to the types of locations in Table 2 . We observe that the proportion is dominated (85+ percent) by only three types of locations: RMNJ (compute card on node board)-55.06 percent, RMNU (link module on node board)-20.88 percent, and QIJ (compute card on I/O board)-11.79 percent.
As for the proportion of fatal events in terms of the size of the block allocated to a job, we can see that 33.39 percent of the fatal events do not belong to any block used by users, in that they occurred on devices not related to job blocks. For instance, the errors reported by the coolant monitor in some compute rack will have no block information in the log's BLOCK field. Similarly, when some errors occur at some node that is not assigned to any jobs for that moment, they have nothing to do with any job block, leading to the NULL block information. In addition, we observe that many of the job block sizes (if not NULL) involved with the fatal events are in the range of [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 192 nodes (i.e., 0-8 racks). The reason is that a large majority of jobs submitted to the system are of small-or mediansize, as presented in Fig. 5a . In absolute terms, 95+ percent jobs requested less than 8194 cores ( 8 racks), according to the MIRA job log. Similarly, based on Fig. 5 , we also observe the distribution of the number of failed jobs is highly consistent with the distribution of total number of jobs, with respect to execution scale and job length respectively. Practical Impact. System administrators can focus mainly on several attributes appearing most often, in order to diagnose the reasons for fatal events and solve the problems quickly.
Novelty of the Takeaway. Although some existing studies also disclosed the proportions of system attributes such as breakdown of failure types and root causes for the LANL system [34] and Sunway series system [25] , the breakdown results are different from ours because of different vendors and architectures. For instance, the major fatal faults in the Sunway Bluelight system are CPU and Internet, while the fatal events mainly strike to the firmware (i.e., monitor of hardware), network controller and machine controller running on the service node. In particular, our study is arguably the first attempt to analyze the breakdown of failures in terms of fine-grained attributes such as specific component, category, location-mode and block size for the largest supercomputer with IBM series architecture.
Investigation of Temporal Feature for System Events
To understand the temporal property of system events, we first study the correlation between fatal and warn messages. Then we focus on the temporal feature of fatal events because they exhibit more prominent mutual correlation than do the other two types of events. We then analyze the daily count distribution of event count throughout the 5-year logging period based on the filtered fatal events, and we computer the MTBFE.
Mining Temporal Correlation based on Message ID
We analyze the temporal correlation of the system events based on message IDs, since the message ID is the most important field that determines many other fields' values. We In Figs. 6a and 6b , respectively, we show the mutual euclidean distance and Pearson correlation for the fatal events and warn events. We denote the mutual correlations between message IDs by small squares. In the right-upper triangular area, the red square, white square, and blue square represent positive correlation, noncorrelation, and negative correlation, respectively. In the left-lower triangular area, the color of the squares indicate the euclidean distance: the darker the color is, the smaller the value of the euclidean distance, and hence a stronger correlation.
Basically, if the Pearson correlation in the figure exhibits a matrix pattern (e.g., Area A in the two subfigures), then the involved events are highly correlated with each other. That is, they constitute a cluster of message IDs that are mutually correlated, as illustrated in Fig. 7 . In the example shown in the figure, the four message IDs, 00040005, 00040020, 00040083, and 000610008, are highly correlated with each other, exhibiting a matrix pattern. In particular, if the Pearson correlation exhibits a triangular pattern (e.g., Area B in the three subfigures), they must be adjacent, highly correlated message IDs. Fig. 6 shows that the message IDs often constitute a cluster with strong mutual correlations. That is, some fatal and warn message IDs follow a property of transmission: if message ID 1 is highly correlated with message ID 2 based on its occurrence days, and message ID 2 is strongly correlated with message ID 3, then we can infer that message ID 1 is also highly correlated with message ID 3.
Takeaway 2. The highly correlated message IDs may often constitute clusters, such that the transmission property can be used to derive the unknown or missing relationship of events, especially for fatal events.
Practical Impact. If two message IDs exhibit similar patterns on the occurrence of days during a period, the administrator needs to focus on just one of them in the correlation analysis, since any other messages highly correlated with either of them must also be correlated with the other.
Novelty of the Takeaway. Although Tiwari et al. [8] also explored the spatial correlation of fatal events for the Titan supercomputer, they mainly focused on the GPU errors in a 3D torus. By comparison, our study is based on a more complicated network -5D torus, and we proposed the transmission property that can be used to derive the unknown or missing relationship of events, which is a novel insight.
In addition to the analysis of mutual correlation for each type of event messages, we perform PCA to understand the correlation across different types of events with various severities, as presented in Fig. 8 . In the figure, each circle point represents a message ID; the closer two circle points are, the stronger the correlation that the corresponding message IDs may have. On the one hand, we observe that the fatal message IDs exhibit a denser cluster than do the other two types of message IDs, thus confirming our conclusion that fatal events have stronger mutual correlations. On the other hand, we observe that fatal events may also be highly correlated with some warn events, since many of red and orange circle points are close to each other based on the PCA. Accordingly, we present the following takeaway.
Takeaway 3. Strong correlations may occur between different types of message IDs, especially between the fatal message ID and warn message ID.
Practical Impact. To understand/predict the behavior of fatal events in the system, the administrator should study not only mutual correlation among fatal events but the correlation between fatal events and other types of messages such as warn messages.
Novelty of the Takeaway. Although existing related work [25] studied the breakdown of warning messages and fatal messages, they did not address the potential correlation in between.
Exploring Occurrence Frequency of Fatal Events
As mentioned previously, we filtered the fatal messages by our similarity-based fatal event constructor (i.e., Algorithm 1). The similarity threshold is set to 0.3 for getting the 1,255 fatal events. If we set it to 0.0, 0.1, 0.5, and 0.8, respectively, the number of fatal events will be 1,209, 1,214, 1,321, and 2,807, respectively, implying the following. On the one hand, since the number of fatal events is not reduced significantly when totally ignoring the similarity function, a large majority of fatal messages actually belong to the spatial duplication of the messages (i.e., most of the duplicated fatal messages occur close on timestamps but with different attributes or on different locations). On the other hand, the similarity-based fatal event construction algorithm can filter the duplicated messages effectively and a similarity threshold of 0.2$0.5 leads to satisfactory filtering results as confirmed by the system administrator.
In Fig. 9 , we present the monthly count of the fatal events, based on which we have two significant findings. First, the number of fatal events per month ranges from 6 to 76, and it stays about 20 in most of cases, while only about 10 fatal events (i.e., about half of the potential fatal event count) per month affect the user jobs on average, as implied by the system administrator. We note that the fatal events constructed here do not represent system failures or interruptions from the perspective of users, but represent all the potential severe issues to the system. That is, many of the fatal events did cause malfunction to some parts of the system, but they did not affect user jobs in practice. For instance, suppose the parallel file system (PFS) runs into an error on some file disks such that they are not accessible for a short period. No user jobs may be affected at all because their data are already loaded into the memory and they do not need to access the PFS during that malfunctioning period. Such "nonharmful" fatal events were not counted in the MTTI by the system administrators. Second, in Fig. 9 , we can clearly see a seasonality feature throughout the 5-year logging period. Specifically, failure rates are lower in the winter and higher in the summer, in terms of the Chicago climate graph (the sub-figure in Fig. 9 ) that is extracted from [35] . The possible reason is that either coolant system or electric wiring system may have a heavier burden in summer than in winter, leading to more potential issues in the hot season. In particular, we can observe that the monthly fatal event count reached up to 76 and 42 in July of 2013 and July of 2015, respectively, which was caused by the circuit breaker problem and coolant system issue, respectively, as confirmed by the system administrator. Fig. 10 presents the daily count of fatal events based on our Algorithm 1. At most six fatal events occur per day after filtering the duplicated messages, compared with the original 36k fatal messages per day as shown in Fig. 3 . The system experienced no fatal events on most of days, and usually only one fatal event on each day if any.
We also compute MTBFE with respect to different attribute values, as shown in Table 3 . We observe that the minimum MTBFE with respect to the most error-prone item for any attribute (component, category, or location_mode) is 2-10 days. We also note that four items dominate the MTBFE, which means that administrators/vendors can focus just on these four items in each column in most cases.
Takeaway 4. Our similarity-based filtering method works very effectively. The filtered fatal event interval is about 1.3 days and the fatal event rate exhibits seasonal variations. The most error-prone item value with respect to any key attribute appears in the log every 2-10 days in the worst case.
Practical Impact. If the fault-tolerance researchers want to simulate/reproduce the failure events in their studies, we suggest to follow the above statistics regarding MTBFE, also considering the seasonable variance. Otherwise, the simulation/research conducted may not be consistent with the practical cases.
Novelty of the Takeaway. Compared to the existing filters (temporal-spatial filter (TSM) [16] and adaptive semantic filter [29] , our designed similarity-based filter is more effective to filter out the duplicated messages. In addition to the mean time between fatal events (MTBFE) of 1.3 days we characterized, we also disclosed the seasonality feature of the fatal events, which is a totally new insight especially because such a study has to be performed based on a longterm, large-scale system log, which was rarely adopted in the existing related work. We explore the best-fit distribution of fatal event intervals with MLE from among 24 candidate distributions by a statistical math library, SSJ [36] . Specifically, we perform the following four steps: (1) compute the MLE parameters for the 24 distributions based on the fatal event intervals; (2) generate the cumulative distribution function (CDF) based on the optimized parameters for each distribution; (3) plot the real distribution based on the fatal event intervals; and (4) identify the best-fit distribution by comparing the real distribution and candidate distributions.
In Fig. 11 , we present the CDF curves of the typical distributions in the order of fitting levels. We can see that the Weibull distribution is the best fit for the fatal event intervals. In addition, the Pearson6 and Gamma distributions also fit the fatal event intervals well, providing more optional distributions for system administrators or researchers to optimize fault tolerance strategies instead of relying only on the Weibull distribution. We present the best-fit MLE parameters in Table 4 , enabling other researchers to reproduce the distribution.
In Figs. 12, 13, and 14, we present the distribution fitting curves for the four most frequent values in the three critical metrics: component, category, and location mode, respectively. Similar to Fig. 11 , the numbers shown ahead of the distribution names indicate the ranking of the similarity, which is evaluated based on the mean squared errors (MSE). That is, we sort different MLE-based distribution curves based on the mean squared errors (MSE) between their data points and real MTBFE data points. The smaller the MSE, the higher the fitting level is. Weibull distribution fits the fatal event intervals well for most of the metrics, except for a few cases such as the component values MC and CNK and the category value AC_TO_DC_PWR.
Takeaway 5. The Weibull distribution is the best fit for the overall fatal event intervals and also for specific metrics, including component, category and location_mode. In addition, Gamma distribution and Pearson6 distribution also exhibit a good fitting in most cases.
Practical Impact. The fault-tolerance researchers are suggested to study the fault-tolerance approaches based on the Weibull distribution on fatal event intervals. The theoretical faulttolerance analysis, however, may be too complicated to be done because of the high complexity of Weibull distribution. Alternatively, other types of failure-interval distributions such as Gamma and Pearson6 are also acceptable.
Novelty of the Takeaway. Compared to the existing studies [25] , [34] , [37] , [38] on the distribution of failure intervals, we did the research in a much finer granularity based on more distributions. Instead, not only did we investigate the fatal event intervals using up to 24 distributions on both the overall fatal events and specific attributes, but we also present the specific MLE parameters of the top-10 bestfit distributions in Table 4 , which can help researchers reproduce the failures in their study.
Spatial Analysis of the Fatal RAS Events
In the spatial correlation analysis, we did not filter the messages on purpose. The reason is that many events with similar attributes, such as block, component, and description, may appear on different locations (such as nodes or racks) with extremely close timestamps in the system. In this situation, we should count all of them for our analysis in order to understand the influential range of these events as well as their spatial correlation. We present the spatial distribution of fatal RAS events on compute racks in Fig. 15 , where different colors represent different numbers of fatal messages (the darker the color is, the more messages). We observe that there are no prominent correlation across racks in a long-term observation, but the correlation across nodes inside a rack is rather high. According to Fig. 15 , the spatial distribution is fairly uneven. In absolute terms, the number of fatal events striking individual nodes is in the range [1, 501] , and up to 5,912 fatal messages occur in a rack throughout the year 2015. About 7 racks report much more fatal events than do the others. Some individual node boards, such as the one in R2B-M0, suffer from significantly more fatal events than do others, because of hardware issues. For a few particular fatal message IDs with a short-term logging period, we may observe a relatively high correlation across racks/midplanes over the 5D torus network, based on our optimized K-means clustering algorithm. As shown in Fig. 16 , the messages with message ID = 000400ED (indicating "unresponsive boards") could be correlated across midplanes (each square in the figure refers to a midplane) over the 5D torus network. As confirmed by the system administrator, the bottom racks experienced a common system issue on April 20th, 2015.
We further analyze the monthly spatial distribution of the fatal RAS events. We present only distribution of events in June 2015 (as shown in Fig. 15b) , because of the space limitation of this paper. The conclusion is also applied to other months in our characterization. Similar to the year-based analysis of spatial distribution (Fig. 15a) , the month-based distribution of fatal errors is not even either, and some fatal events appear intensely to all of the nodes inside a particular rack, such as R09 in June.
Takeaway 6. For a relatively long-term yearly period, we do not observe a clear locality feature or correlation across the errorprone racks. However, we do observe relatively strong locality correlations within a rack. That is, for the error-prone racks, all their nodes likely encounter fatal events instead of only one or two nodes. For a few particular message IDs with a short-term period, we can also observe a certain correlation over the 5D torus network based on our optimized K-means clustering algorithm.
Practical Impact. System administrators are recommended to diagnose the detected fatal events or errors in the granularity of racks based on both long-term analysis and short-term analysis. Only a few particular message IDs such as 000400ED may fail a set of racks simultaneously, exhibiting a correlation across racks.
Novelty of the Takeaway. Unlike most of the existing studies [8] , [16] , [24] focusing on the spatial correlation across cabinets, racks or midplanes, we provide a finer-granularity analysis, by disclosing the fact that the spatial correlation is mainly observed inside racks instead of across racks in most of time, in terms of our in-depth probability analysis and optimized K-means clustering algorithm.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of an extremescale system with a total of 786k cores running during the past five years. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to provide a comprehensive analysis of the properties and correlations of the system events in the IBM Blue Gene/ Q system; our work also involves a super-large system scale and longest consecutive logging period up to date. We first propose an effective system log analysis tool with an effective duplicated message filtering algorithm, by taking into account severity level, the administrator's maintenance periods, reservation periods, temporal correlation, spatial correlation on a Torus network and so on. The evaluation based on MIRA RAS log shows that the LogAider is very helpful for revealing spatial-correlations and very accurate (up to 95 percent similarity compared with ground-truth) in the mining of temporal correlations. The total number of fatal events can be reduced to about 1255 compared with originally 2.6 million duplicated fatal messages.
We present six conclusions/takeaways for system administrators/vendors and fault-tolerance researchers, as well as the practical impacts and also highlight the novelty of the takeaways. For instance, we find that the distribution or proportion of the fatal system events follow a Pareto-like principle in general. The temporal correlation among fatal events is much stronger than that of warn messages and info messages, and the correlated events tend to constitute a few clusters. The MTBFE of the Mira system is about 1.3 days from the perspective of the system, and the MTTI is 2-4 days from the perspective of users. The most errorprone item value with respect to any key attribute appears likely in the log every 2-10 days. The majority of fatal events are associated with 3-5 of the most error-prone items with respect to particular attributes such as component or category. Weibull, Gamma, and Pearson6 are the three best-fit distributions for the fatal event intervals. The overall correlation of fatal events on the 5D torus network is not prominent, whereas the small-region locality correlation (e.g., the fatal events inside racks) is relatively strong. We believe our work will be interesting to large-scale HPC system administrators and vendors and to fault tolerance researchers, enabling them to better understand fatal events and mitigate such events accordingly.
We plan to keep analyzing the job failure events and also the correlation between fatal events and other severity-level events. We also plan to study the impact of the user behaviors on their job execution failures and to design a lightweight runtime predictor based on our analysis.
